



Questions about reality, its limits, nature and structure are still the most funda-
mental and the most difficult questions put to humankind and to philosophers 
by humanity. Each attempt at rationalizing reality or deepening its structure en-
counters many obstacles. Endeavours to define it in detail depend on the point 
of viewing it, that is, on objective, subjective or ontological, as well as existen-
tial, perspectives, etc. This work will focus on Józef Maria Bocheński’s inclina-
tion towards seeing the world and its logical structure from the point of view of 
ontology. 
In section 2, we shall discuss the perception of the world deriving from 
Bocheński, while in the third section – issues of its logical structure will be dealt 
with. In section 4, we will present a formal framework of the structure of the 
world.
The World as an Object of Ontology 
Let us start by determining how Bocheński defines ontology. It appears that in 
his Autoprezentacja [Self-Presentation] he defines himself as an Aristotelian and 
acknowledges the prote filosofia of ontology, admitting that it is to him “the most 
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abstract theory of the object at all.”1 He declares, at the same time, that ontology 
as a general theory of the object (being) is for him nothing else but formal logic.2 
Both of these disciplines have a common object of studies, although the methods 
used by them do differ. Ontology, in the given framework, is not only an ontology 
of real objects, but also that of ideal ones, in a similar way to logic in its contem-
porary form. If the world is an ontological object, then it is justifiable to ask the 
question of how it is perceived by Bocheński.
First of all, we should state that the word “world” is ambiguous and can be in-
terpreted in a variety of ways. The manner in which Bocheński perceives objects 
and the world as an ontological object (being) can be demonstrated using the fol-
lowing selection of his opinions (in compliance with his ontological terminology 
included in The Methods of Contemporary Thought):
The world is made up of things (elements, substances), such as mountains, 
plants, men, etc., which are characterized by various properties – e.g. colors, 
shapes, dispositions, etc. – and linked one with another by a variety of rela-
tions. The general philosophical name for everything which is or can be is 
“being” (Seiendes); even such things as properties and relationships will thus 
be called “beings”. It is possible to distinguish two aspects in every being: what 
it is – its nature, its “whatness”, its essence – and the aspect which consists in 
the fact that the being is, its Dasein, its existence.3
In another place in his self-presentation, Bocheński writes that the world con-
sists primitively of units (substances) determined by certain properties and con-
nected by defined, often also real, relations.4 Therefore, the world in Bocheński’s 
understanding is a whole composed of all beings with certain properties and con-
nected by relationships. Does this mean that Bocheński perceives the world solely 
as a world of real objects?
1 J.M. Bocheński, Autoprezentacja, trans. J. Garewicz, in: Logika i filozofia. Wybór pism, Warszawa 
1993, pp. XXVII and XXVIII [Ger. orig.: Sellbstdarstellung, in: Philosophe in Sellbstdarstellungen 
I, ed. L.J. Pongratz, Hamburg 1975, pp. 1–36].
2 Bocheński writes about the mutual relation between logic and ontology from the perspective 
of Western history in J.M. Bocheński, Logika i ontologia, trans. D. Gabler, in: Logika i filozofia. 
Wybór pism, op. cit., pp. 106-132 [Eng. orig.: Logic and Ontology, “Philosophy East and West” 
1974, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 275–292].
3 J.M. Bocheński, The Methods of Contemporary Thought, trans. P. Caws, Dordrecht 1965, p. 3.
4 J.M. Bocheński, Autoprezentacja, op. cit., p. XXVIII.
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According to him, objects are not only things, but also each object understood 
very broadly, that is, as something about which a statement can be made. Onto-
logical objects are things and also their properties, as well as the relations be-
tween them. Such objects are states of affairs as well, since Bocheński writes that
if a being is modified in some way – e.g. if a thing is red, or a geometrical figure 
has twice the area of another – we are confronted with a state of affairs.5 
And a little further: 
States of affairs are not independent of one another. On the contrary, it often 
happens that if one state of affairs is the case, then another is also the case. The 
world may be thought of as an interrelated pattern of states of affairs. Indeed 
it is itself a colossal and extremely complicated state of affairs, in which every-
thing that is or can be is connected with everything else in an endless network 
of relationships.6
The world perceived ontologically, in accordance with Bocheński’s vision, is 
– at the same time – a complete whole of harmoniously ordered objects, which – 
apart from all the bodily objects – are composed of their properties and the rela-
tions established between them.
It follows from Bocheński’s argumentation that the world to him is not exclu-
sively a material, real world, though. As a rationalist he comprehends it not only 
as a palpable reality, but also as an ideal and potential one, possessing a logical 
structure anyway. The world is to him, like things, features and relationships, an 
ontological object, a being, an object of studies of ontology as a universal theory 
of beings.
According to Bocheński, objects are also ideal beings. He defines himself as a 
Platonian when he writes the following:
It is my Platonism that separates me from my positivist friends, the conviction 
that there exists an ideal object and not only real ones and (sharing the belief 
with Whitehead) that there is no explanation of what is real without reference 
to the ideal being. […] Habitually, we reject the ideal object verbally only to 
have it smuggled in shortly afterwards.
5 J.M. Bocheński, The Methods…, op. cit., p. 2.
6 Ibidem, p. 3.
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[…] From the ontological viewpoint, my Platonism asserts that there exist also 
ideal things, content, etc. It is true that I do not think that the things are flying 
somewhere around “in the world” and I am rather inclined to accept that they 
arise only thanks to people. But man recognizes such things. […] they are not 
his thoughts […] but the content of thoughts. They are given objectively.7
Advocating the Aristotelian-Kantian perspective, Bocheński accepts that 
“whatever is ideal, is a form of whatever is real and can be extracted from there 
in some way by our intellect and updated.”8 The ontology of the object has a few 
varieties in Bocheński’s view: ontology of the real object, ontology of the object 
and property, ontology of conditions (relational and functional), ontology of the 
ideal object and the like.
At the same time, Bocheński accepts the primacy of the real object over the 
ideal one. Earlier, as a rationalist, he wrote:
It is believed that we cannot know everything fully. It is very possible that 
there exist things which are cognizable only externally, isomorphously, as we 
used to say in logic. Obviously, such a thing is God and there may exist also 
other ones. My rationalism says, however, that what we are able to know about 
things, we know it within logic – not outside it – thanks to logical means.9
Thus, Bocheński differentiates the cognizable reality from the world as such, 
perceived as broadly as it is only possible, containing all classes of beings. Such 
a world includes not only the real world (treated as the set of all the cognizable 
objects in common experience, the world of temporal beings, beings existing in 
time). It comprises the world of nature as well (a concrete occupying the whole 
space at any given time).10 According to Bocheński, the world is the whole of 
reality understood as widely as possible, comprising both material and ideal be-
ings. The world to Bocheński is heterogenic and not only homogenic (the material 
7 J.M. Bocheński, Autoprezentacja, op. cit., pp. XXV, XXVI. All quotations have been translated by 
Jacek Jędrzejowski.
8 Ibidem, pp. XXV, XXVI.
9 Ibidem, p. XXII.
10 See A. Biłat, The World as an Object of Formal Philosophy, in: Contemporary Polish Ontology, ed. 
B. Skowron, Berlin–Boston 2020, pp. 87–108. The concrete (the world of nature) is here a col-
lective, mereological set, the largest material whole; it occupies the entire space at any given time 
while the real world is here the set of all concretes, i.e., the empirically recognizable objects that 
occupy a certain place at a certain time. The real world does not include any relations or ideal 
objects that belong to the whole world. 
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wholeness of bodily beings, a collective set, homogenous as far as certain of their 
properties are concerned, for example, temporality, variability, etc.).11
Relationships between the concepts of the world as a extensional whole (W), 
the real world (rW) and the world of nature (nW) in Bocheński’s framework can 
be written as follows:12 
nW ∈ rW ⊂ W.
where “⊂” denotes the set-theoretical proper inclusion and “∈”denotes the 
membership relation.
The Logical Structure of the World
In his Autoprezentacja, Bocheński defines himself as a rationalist and, stressing 
the importance of the intellect, he writes:
The intellect seen objectively is the same as formal logic. There results thus 
the following vision of the world: it is a colossal, to the highest degree compli-
cated, mass of things, properties and occurrences. Still, impenetrable though 
it appears at the beginning, it does possess a completely defined (static and 
dynamic) structure. Indeed, the “structure” is another word that means “a 
network of relations.” Formal logic, on the other hand, is nothing more than 
the most general theory of relations. This means that the world has logical 
structure. It even seems to me that the expression “a non-logical structure” is 
a contradiction.13
Therefore, it may be assumed that in Bocheński’s framework the world has a 
relational structure, and it contains a network of relationships possessing formal 
properties that enable their description. These formal properties are the domain 
of the theory of relations, which is the most general section of formal logic.
The formal description of the structure of the world, its organization, does 
not include the description of individual properties of beings or the description 
of specific relations between them. The description of the formal properties of 
11 See J. Herbut, Leksykon filozofii klasycznej, Lublin 1997, p. 501. 
12 Cf. A. Biłat, The World…, op. cit., p. 96.
13 See J.M. Bocheński, Autoprezentacja, op. cit., pp. XX, XXII.
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relations, which are components of the world’s structure and types of these rela-
tions, is established in the theory of relations as a logical theory. It is this theory 
that serves to analyze reality and to identify the world’s structure as a relational 
structure.
It can be supposed that Bocheński knew the works of Rudolf Carnap, who 
precisely defined what he understood by formal properties of a relation:
By formal properties of a relation, we mean those that can be formulated 
without reference to the meaning of the relation and the type of objects be-
tween which it holds. They are the subject of the theory of relations. The for-
mal properties of relations can be defined exclusively with the aid of logistic 
symbols, i.e., ultimately with the aid of the few fundamental symbols which 
form the basis of logistics (symbolic logic). (Thus these symbols do not specifi-
cally belong to the theory of relations, but form the basis for the entire system 
of logic–propositional logic, the theory of propositional functions (concepts), 
the theory of classes, and the theory of relations.)14 
Bocheński perceives himself as a rationalist. “My rationalism,” he writes, 
“consists first of all in that I have always treated reality as cosmos, not as chaos.”15 
To him the world is a logical cosmos. In opposition to chaos it has an ordered 
structure, is an ordered whole.
Thus, the structure of reality as a network of relations is a whole, a system of 
logically distributed, mapped out objects connected by relations. Bocheński be-
lieves that whatever stands against logic cannot exist in the world.
Bocheński realizes that such a statement raises a great deal of questions about 
people, and so he answers it in the following way:
How can we know that the world is a logical cosmos? The answer to this ques-
tion seems simple: The whole of human experience and – first of all – the ex-
perience of the natural sciences, assumes this thesis and it has always turned 
out that the thesis is confirmed. In the face of this fact it seems to me simply 
unreasonable to doubt the logical structure of the world.16
14 R. Carnap, The Logical Structure the World, trans. R.A. George, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1969, Part 
Two, Chap. A, Sec. 11, p. 21 [Ger. orig.: Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Wien 1928]. 
15 J.M. Bocheński, Autoprezentacja, op. cit., p. XX.
16 Ibidem, p. XXI (emphasis added).
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Again, in his Autoprezentacja, Bocheński promotes quietened theory-cogni-
tive optimism, which consists in
some dose of trust in the human intellect, […] in accepting the fact that al-
though it is with difficulty and in an incomplete manner, we still can recog-
nize certain states of things in the way that they are, and this without express-
ing towards them any fear or disgust, but through a common experience and 
reasoning.17
Further in his work, Bocheński states that for him, as a rationalist,
[p]aradoxically, the anti-sceptic attitude arises from the belief that the world 
is extraordinarily complicated and that we can recognize very little of it. The 
reality is not exclusively the same as we perceive it to be. It does not limit itself 
to human experience. It is most likely that we do not know many things, many 
are known only superficially, yet we do know something very precisely and for 
sure. The whole human experience speaks for rationalism, and there is noth-
ing to speak against it.18
Bocheński advocates the rationalization of the world as one possessing the 
logical structure that can be regarded as its foundation, which determines it as 
a whole of its harmoniously ordered elements, objects, beings.19 These elements, 
beings or objects are not only those really existing, but also ideal ones.
The world W, according to Bocheński, has a rational, logical and relational 
structure, which means that its foundation, a logically ordered system of coor-
dinated elements, is a set of hierarchically ordered beings. It is a certain whole 
conditioned by a stable logical ordering of its components and linked by means 
of relations. Its components, elements are things and states of things as well as 
ideal individuals (zero-argument relations), possessing certain properties or fea-
tures (one-argument relations) and connected by many-argument relations. This 
order of the components, elements of the world is the source of the cosmic order, 
harmonies which are revealed through the laws of nature.
17 Ibidem, pp. XXII–XXIII.
18 Ibidem, p. XXIII(emphasis added).




The Formal Structure of the World
The considerations of the previous parts of this work can be given a formal, logi-
cal shape. In this respect, something is a structure when it constitutes a formally 
determinable relational structure. 
The relational structure20 of the world W (reality) is an ordered triple:
W = < W, {Ri}i ∈ U,{Oj}j ∈ S >,
where the world W (called domain) is a non-empty set of all things, states 
of things and ideal individuals, U and S are subsets of the set N of all natu-
ral numbers, {Ri}i ∈ U is an indexed set of all unary relations (properties, 
features) on W and many-ary relations on W, while {Oj}j ∈ S is an indexed 
set of operations on W. If it is empty, the structure W is a pure relational 
structure, and if the set of relations is empty, this structure is an algebra. 
As we have already mentioned, the world W, according to Bocheński, is a logi-
cal cosmos. As such, standing in opposition to chaos, it is organized by some 
hidden, internal natural order,21 by a certain solid relation ordering the nucleus 
of the world’s structure and all of its elements.22 The leading philosophers and 
ontologists of our “Western” cultural circle basically agree that that cosmos – in 
the language of philosophy – is a world conceived as an internally ordered whole, 
in contrast to chaos. Reconstructing Bocheński’s conception of the logical struc-
ture of the world in a formal way, it needs observing that the relational structure 
W of the world W assumes that the components of its domain W are ordered. 
We denote the ordering relation W by ≤ ; it cannot be a relation belonging to the 
world W.23 Then, in Bocheński’s framework, the logical structure of the world W 
is represented by the following, slightly enriched system:
W′ = < (W, ≤), {Ri}i ∈ U ,{Oj}j ∈ S>, 
20 See W.A. Pogorzelski, Notions and Theorems of Elementary Formal Logic, Białystok 1994, p. 386.
21 See A. Grzegorczyk, W poszukiwaniu ukrytego sensu. Myśli i szkice filozoficzne, Lublin 2018, part 
3.1: Ukryty porządek świata, pp. 211–219. 
22 It needs noting that among the relations Ri in the structure W there can be found many relations 
which order spatially, temporally, causatively or in any other manner. They are not relations 
which order the whole universum W, though.
23 It can be understood as a universal relation holding between all elements of the whole world W. 
Relations Ri belong to the world W and they are defined for some classes of elements of the 
world W.
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in which ≤ is a binary ordering relation on W, that is, a reflexive, asymme-
tric and transitive relation on W. 
To Bocheński, the structure of the world is a network of relations, a configura-
tion of beings which are mutually connected to one another by the relations, suit-
ably logically distributed, mapped out in the substructure (W, ≤) of the structure 
W′. It can be supposed that the structure (W, ≤) forms a logical algebraic lattice.24 
At the same time, both the temporal world – a dynamic one with the domain of 
temporal beings (beings existing in time) – and the static world – one with the 
domain of static beings treated as an extensional whole – have a logical structure. 
It is disputable whether its structure (W, ≤) has the form of a logical-algebraic 
lattice.
Reconstructing formally the conception of the logical structure of the world 
on the basis of the views put forward by Bocheński in several of his letters, I em-
barked on faithfully recreating his ideas or viewpoints on the world and its struc-
ture. Some general stances on the world and its extensional whole had already 
been worked out by European philosophers in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. 
In the last century, the best-known idea of the conceptual structure that catego-
rized the world from the perspective of ontology and logic was expounded in 
Carnap’s seminal work Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928).25 Apart from this, 
an outline of the general conception of the world’s structure can be found in 
works of contemporary philosophers. For example, we find some ontological-
logical considerations dealing with the world as a set of things possessing dif-
ferent properties and being connected by relations, as well as forming different 
sets, in the book Mała propedeutyka filozofii naukowej [A Short Introduction to 
Academic Philosophy] by Andrzej Grzegorczyk.26 In this author’s framework, the 
world is not only, as Bocheński argued, a world of real beings, observable, but also 
possesses ideal ones (non-observable, imagined or merely thought about), which 
hold certain properties.27 In frameworks and descriptions of the logical structure 
24 This supposition is based on the observation that the word “structure” was and still is used 
in philosophy, logic and algebra in a variety of meanings, specifically just like that of “lattice,” 
meaning an ordered set in which each two elements have infimum and supremum (see, e.g., 
S. Krajewski, ed., Słownik pojęć filozoficznych, Warszawa 1996, p. 187, and G. Birkhoff, S. Mac 
Lane, Przegląd algebry współczesnej, Warszawa 1966, pp. 375, 376). 
25 R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, op. cit.
26 A. Grzegorczyk, Mała propedeutyka filozofii naukowej, Warszawa 1989, Chap. 2: Ogólna struktu-
ra świata.
27 Ibidem, p. 23.
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of the world that are known to me, indeed, it is hardly possible to come across 
a formal reconstruction of such a structure that would comply with the ideas of 
Bocheński’s conception, which can be “fished out” of his letters.
Man in Bocheński’s World
The world as a whole, according to Bocheński, consists of things, states of things 
and ideal objects. Man occupies an important place in this world. He is not the 
creator of the world but its co-creator and as such bears responsibility for the 
world, is obligated to take care of its being and his own in particular. Conse-
quently, he is faced with certain tasks and commitments. The care for the being is 
made real in his rational, wise acting and behaving, and invests him with a sense 
of the reasonability of his whole life. The greatness of man consists precisely in 
that he is capable of creative reacting to his own fate, making sensible choices, 
shaping his existence and rational participation in the existence of community.
The peculiar greatness of Bocheński consists in the fact that although he per-
formed many different roles,28 “he was a scholar, soldier, priest, monk, teacher, 
advisor to governments, political activist, publicist and journalist, pilot, driver, 
preacher, ‘star’ of international congresses, organizer and builder […] and acted 
well beyond each of them,” he was able to describe in a simple manner indi-
cations relating to man’s struggle with secrets of the world and life. Bocheński 
writes about man’s place in this world, among others, in the Introduction to his 
Podręcznik mądrości tego świata [A Coursebook on the Wisdoms of This World], 
in which we read:
Man himself and all his creations in the form of nations, cultures, achieve-
ments of science, etc., are fragments of no importance in the Universe. The 
world is in particular a real cemetery of dead civilizations and nations. Every-
thing sinks in nothingness. What is more, our inner lives depend to a great 
extent on this world, on the laws of nature. […] Man is a tiny, helpless frag-
ment of the world, existing only during a fraction of the cosmic second, yet 
28 See Cz. Porębski, ed., …Skoro Pan Bóg raczył mi w swojej dobroci dać trochę rozumu, to po to, 
abym go używał…, “Znak” 1995, Vol. 481, p. 14.
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this fraction is everything we have at our disposal. How to proceed so as not to 
waste it – this is taught to us through commandments of wisdom.29
Father Bocheński considered the commandment “Proceed in such a way as 
to live a long and prosperous life” to be the fundamental, the first and the most 
significant principle of wisdom. Several dozen other principles follow from the 
above-quoted one, with the inclusion of experimental data.30 It is in them that 
Bocheński provides recommendations on how to live in the modern world and 
shows what the sense of individual beings is.
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Summary
This paper will focus on J.M. Bocheński’s inclination towards seeing the world 
and its logical structure from the point of view of ontology. Accordingly, on the 
basis of Bocheński’s selected utterances we will present and discuss the percep-
tion of the world proposed by the scholar, and then we will deal with questions 
pertaining to the logical structure of the world and examine a formal framework 
of this structure.
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